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Application of Center-Periphery Theory to the Study  
of Vietnam-China Relations in the Middle Ages*
Nguyen Thi My Hanh**
Based on the generalizations in international researchers’ views on the relationship 
between the center and the periphery, the author maps out a theory on the relation-
ship between Vietnam (as the periphery) and China (as the center of East Asia) 
during feudalism.  On the basis of the theory of central-peripheral relationships and 
the realities of a diplomatic relationship between Vietnam and China during feudal-
ism, the article proves not only that China considered itself to be the center of East 
Asia with the role of “educating” surrounding peripheries, but also that surrounding 
countries were influenced by Chinese Confucian ideologies.  For example, Vietnam 
also followed the Chinese-centric order.  Accordingly, acts such as requesting inves-
titure and tribute from Vietnam to the “center” (China) were sustained for a long 
period, although there was no balance in interest between the two countries.  In 
addition to the subordinate tendency of the periphery in relation to the center, there 
is a centrifugal tendency because of the asymmetry in interest.  In the case of the 
Vietnam-China relationship at that time, Vietnam’s subordinate tendency was rela-
tive and superficial, while the centrifugal tendency was mainstream.  The author 
shows that the strong centrifugal tendency led to the transformation of Vietnam’s 
position from a Chinese vassal/peripheral state into a center in relationships with 
smaller countries in Southeast Asia.
Keywords: center, periphery, subordinate tendency, centrifugal tendency, 
Chinese-centric order
Introduction
The center-periphery theory and the interaction between the two elements is a well-
established research subject.  At the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth 
century, some scientists of the geography-anthropology school, such as L. Frobenius, 
F. Ratse (Ratzel 1882), and F. Grabner (1911) introduced diffusionism theory to explain 
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the geographic spread of culture.  Since then, many researchers around the world have 
continued to discuss the multidimensional interaction between the center and periphery 
on a geopolitical level from the perspectives of political sociology (Galtung 1971; Gunder 
Frank 1971; Naustdalslid 1974) and cultural anthropology (Wissler 1922).  Furthermore, 
several researchers have discussed the cultural interaction between the center and 
periphery, with the periphery receiving the spread and dissemination of the central cul-
ture.  In fact, the center-periphery concept is used for different purposes, but all are based 
on the idea that societal relations can be analyzed using the center-periphery model, and 
that the relationship between center and periphery is of fundamental importance for an 
understanding of the society or sector of society one is concerned with (McKenzie 1977, 
55–74).  Within the scope of this article, the author can only select some of the most 
prominent works that deal directly with the relationship between the center and the 
periphery as well as the degree of interaction between them to illuminate a specific case. 
This case is the diplomatic relationship between the great nation of China (regarded as 
the center) and the smaller country of Vietnam (considered the periphery) since the 
beginning of the tenth century.
The period of study begins in 938, when Vietnam gained independence after centu-
ries of Chinese rule, and ends in 1885, when France and China signed the Tianjin Treaty 
ending the tributary relationship between Vietnam and China.  Vietnam was no longer a 
vassal state of China, nor did it see China as a mother country anymore; instead, it 
depended on France (Documents diplomatiques 1885, 259–260).  During this period, the 
relationship between China and Vietnam was indeed a relationship between two nations, 
between two sovereign states.  At the same time, this was also when Vietnam was a 
peripheral, or vassal, state in its relations with China and under the tributary system of 
which China was the center.  It should be noted that the periods immediately before 938, 
when Vietnam was a Chinese district, and after 1885, when Vietnam was a French colony, 
are not suitable for applying center-periphery theory.  This is because the relationship 
between Vietnam and China just before the tenth century and after 1885 was essentially 
a relationship between geopolitical entities in which Vietnam was not an independent 
state that had the right to take the initiative in diplomatic relations with China.
The current study focuses on the following problems: What are the similarities and 
differences between this central-peripheral relationship at the regional level and center-
periphery theory?  In addition to being a cultural center, did China cultivate other supe-
rior elements to form its own “center” in the contemporary East Asian order?  As a 
peripheral country, was Vietnam somehow attracted to Chinese culture, politics, and 
economy?  Was Vietnam completely absorbed into the orbit of the Chinese center, or did 
it ceaselessly attempt to be centrifugal, to itself become a center in Southeast Asia with 
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a similar position to China?  In the present context, China’s strong rise—coupled with 
its ambition of establishing an Asia-centric world order in which it is in a global dominant 
position—is becoming a challenge for many countries in the region and around the world. 
Therefore, studying the above questions using the center-periphery model is necessary 
in order to draw lessons that can be applied to the current context.
This article begins with an overview of the center-periphery theory as discussed in 
the works of prominent scholars such as John Scott, Gordon Marshall, Edward Shils, 
Samuel P. Huntington, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Brantly Womack.  The article does 
not mention every aspect of center-periphery theory but focuses on the most funda-
mental issues of the theory that can be applied to relations between Vietnam and China 
in the tenth to nineteenth centuries.  In addition to pointing out the strengths of this 
theory, the author also points out the shortcomings.  Subsequently, this article applies 
the basic tenets of the theory to the practical study of Chinese-Vietnamese relations from 
the tenth century to the nineteenth century, a period in which China played a central role 
and Vietnam acted as a peripheral state.  The paper concludes with the parallels between 
theory and practice, as well as pointing out the contributions and additions of practice to 
theory.
Center-Periphery Theory
The concept of center and periphery is becoming popular in social science research.  In 
the literature there are many pairs of concepts with similar categories, such as nucleus 
and periphery, core and periphery, urban and suburban satellite, and urban and suburban. 
Whatever it is called, no researcher can deny the interaction between center and periph-
ery.  As the English sociologists Scott and Marshall said, “The centre-periphery (or 
core-periphery) model is a spatial metaphor which describes and attempts to explain the 
structural relationship between the advanced or metropolitan ‘center’ and a less devel-
oped ‘periphery’” (Scott and Marshall 1994, 71).  Accordingly, it is impossible to deter-
mine what an advanced center is if it is not placed in a comparable position with less 
advanced peripheries.  Thus, there is no center without a periphery, and vice versa: there 
can be no periphery without a center for reference.
The center-periphery theory, born in capitalist countries, is used by researchers to 
refer to the relationship between developed capitalist societies and developing countries, 
with the former playing the role of center and the latter existing as peripheries.  However, 
because of the universality of this theory, it is now applied to research not only in the 
capitalist world but also in various social regimes and in geography, cultural anthropology, 
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literature, or diplomatic history.
The theory of the relationship between the center and periphery shows three points 
of view, with almost opposite opinions.  The first shows that the relationship is based on 
consensus rather than confrontation.  The typical expression of this opinion was stated 
by the American sociologist Shils (1910–95) in his “Center and Periphery” (1961).  He 
made a great contribution by introducing the center-periphery concept into the social 
scientific academic vocabulary.  According to Shils, no confrontation exists between the 
center and periphery: there is always a certain consensus.  The center (on a cultural 
level) is the place where traditional values converge, especially rituals and sacred beliefs, 
and it receives prestige from peripheral countries.  Accordingly, Shils defines the center 
concept as something that is paramount and extremely sacred in the field of symbols, 
values, and creeds (Shils 1961a, 117; 1975, 3).  He uses the concept of center-periphery 
when examining the relationship between cities and provinces in a country (Shils 1961a). 
Through the specific case of cities and provinces in India, he clarifies the relationship 
between the center (city) and periphery (province).  According to Shils, the city is the 
center of vitality and a cradle of creativity, while the provinces are rude, unimaginative, 
clumsy, subtle, crude, mediocre, and narrow.  He realizes that in order to have “affluent 
dependence” and not be impoverished, provinces (peripheries) need to be culturally 
saved by the center (city), which has a respectable culture (Shils 1961b).  From that 
respect, the center causes the periphery to follow it.  This thought is the premise for the 
diffusionism theory, which discusses characteristics of culture and the diffusion of culture 
from the center to the periphery.  The propagation of culture from the center to the 
periphery was later described by Robert Winthrop in his Dictionary of Concepts in Cultural 
Anthropology as being “both contingent and arbitrary” (Winthrop 1991, 83–84).
Contrary to Shils’s point of view, there is a second opinion stream represented by 
Huntington.  Huntington is well known for his work “The Clash of Civilizations?” (1993), 
which was later developed into a book titled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking 
of World Order (1996).  In his opinion, “Civilization identity will be more important in the 
future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven 
or eight major civilizations.”  These civilizations include Western, Confucian, Japanese, 
Muslim, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African (Huntington 1993, 
22).  Thus, Huntington divided the world into seven—possibly eight—civilizations.  He 
states that when looking at the relationship between the center of a civilization and its 
periphery, he sees no consensus and cooperation like Shils did; rather, he predicts (almost 
asserts) a clash among them: “Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in 
the evolution of conflict in the modern world” (ibid., 25).
Not agreeing with the views of either Shils or Huntington, the American scientists 
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Wallerstein and Womack came up with a fairly neutral view between the two.  Although 
they do not specifically mention center-periphery theory, the asymmetric theory of 
international relations, which Womack put forward, is essentially about asymmetry in 
the relationship between the center and the periphery, between larger and smaller coun-
tries.  From works such as “Asymmetry Theory and China’s Concept of Multipolarity” 
(Womack 2004, 351–366), China and Vietnam: Politics and Asymmetry (Womack 2006), 
“Asymmetry and China’s Tributary System” (Womack 2012a, 37–54), and Asymmetry 
and International Relationships (Womack 2012b), we see that Womack chose China as 
the main axis in his study of international relations in Asia.  China’s centrality to its 
neighbors gives it territorial and political advantages in the forms of security, wealth, and 
economic prosperity, especially in times of weakness and political disorientation among 
its neighbors (Womack 2012a, 39).  In particular, the influence of Chinese Confucian 
culture on neighboring countries and, consequently, the survival of the tributary system 
for a long time makes Womack recognize China as a “solid center” in comparison with 
other centers around the world.  In this regard, Womack states: “In contrast to the 
tradi tional West that had a ‘liquid center’—the Mediterranean—around and through 
which regimes swirled, China has been Asia’s ‘solid center’ of greatest productivity and 
population” (ibid.).  However, he still has to acknowledge the relative power of the 
relationship between the center and the periphery, between large and small countries. 
According to him, it is an asymmetric relationship: the smaller countries always carry 
their “vulnerability” (Womack 2004, 365).  If “larger states are prudent, consultative and 
cooperative . . . smaller states are less likely to be worried about their vulnerability” and 
thus will “tend to accept the international order led by the larger state because it is 
inclusive of their interests” (ibid.).  Conversely, when large countries do not cooperate 
with small countries and threaten their interests—actions that make small countries 
vulnerable—the tendency to become dependent decreases, even to the point of the two 
sides confronting each other.  Thus, Womack affirms, “The key to a peaceful frontier did 
not lie in dominating neighbors, but rather in managing a mutually acceptable relation-
ship” (Womack 2012a, 42).  In addition, he points out that one of the most important 
factors that can weaken China’s central position is the expansion of other peripheral 
relationships around the center (ibid., 44).
Wallerstein’s views are similar to Womack’s.  In more than 20 books and more than 
300 scientific papers, Wallerstein discusses world system theory associated with a 
central- peripheral perspective.  Although his theory is based on the study of European 
cases and capitalism, many of his arguments are generalized, reflecting the universal 
nature of central-peripheral relationships around the world through historical periods.
Among his works, the four-volume The Modern World-System can be considered the 
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most representative.  In Volume 1, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European 
World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (Wallerstein 1974), and Volume 4, Centrist 
Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914 (Wallerstein 2011), Wallerstein initially shows 
unequal development relations among countries in the same world system.  Specifically, 
he emphasizes inequality and exploitation between the center and periphery: resources 
such as capital and labor were exploited in the capitalist society that he lived in.  More-
over, he states that the allocation of capital, resources, and labor takes place under 
unequal competition between the center and periphery, and among central areas.  He 
also initially discusses this asymmetric relationship under feudalism, saying, “During 
the feudal period, political power of empires was dependent on the economic power 
of govern ment through commercial monopoly combined with the usage of force from 
which governed the flow of commerce from Periphery into the centre” (ibid.).  In Volume 
3, The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s–1840s 
(Wallerstein 1989), Wallerstein takes a global economic perspective to assert that Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia, including China, existed as the periphery in the nineteenth 
century, while Europe played the role of center.
Continuing in this research direction, he published two works, The Capitalist World-
Economy (1979) and Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System 
(1991) to further illustrate the theory of center-periphery relationships.  In the former, 
Wallerstein analyzes the basic contrasts between the center and peripheries.  In his 
opinion, the unequal distribution of resources in the economy and the “superiority” 
of institutions in central states are key determinants of the center’s power versus 
peripheries’.  As a result, the center plays the dominant and decisive role while peripher-
ies tend to be isolated and dependent (Wallerstein 1979, 1–164).  An asymmetry of 
interests in the relationship between center and periphery is thus inevitable.  Conse-
quently, the periphery is constantly looking to fight insidiously or publicly to change the 
current order.  As V. E. Davidovich, in Under the Lens of Philosophy, asserts, “The whole 
play of world political forces depends on its struggle and confrontation (periphery) with 
center [sic]” (Davidovich 2002, 433).  Davidovich emphasizes the unstable nature of the 
center: in addition to the center and the periphery, there are also semi-peripheral coun-
tries.  The semi-periphery is in the buffer position between the center and periphery.  It 
constantly tries to improve its position by getting out of its peripheral status and becom-
ing the new center, which is complementary to the original center.  Therefore, there are 
semi-peripheral areas that act as a periphery to the center but are the center of other 
peri pheries.  This results in unpredictable changes in the positions of centers, semi-
peripheries, and peripheries (Wallerstein 1979, 88–90).
Thus, through the central-peripheral theoretical analysis of a number of scholars, 
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we find the basic issues that can be applied to a study of the relationship between Vietnam 
(periphery) and China (center) from the beginning of the tenth century to the late 
nineteenth century.  First, researchers have pointed out the fundamental factors that 
determine the central location of a large country in a region: natural advantages, geo-
graphic location, cultural superiority, economic and political development, and the ability 
to provide security for smaller countries.  These advantages of the center make periph-
eral countries respect it and accept the international order it leads.
Second, researchers have shown that the relationship between the center and the 
periphery is an asymmetric one of powers and interests.  This gives peripheral countries 
a feeling of “vulnerability” that no country can eliminate (Womack 2004, 365).
Third, while Shils asserts that the relationship between the center and periphery is 
based merely on consensus with no confrontation, Huntington makes a negative forecast 
about the inevitable confrontation between the center and periphery.  Based on prior 
research and historical facts, Womack and Wallerstein reevaluate it as a two-sided rela-
tionship.  According to them, the periphery depends on the center out of respect and 
because it seeks cultural, economic, and institutional salvation from the center to escape 
from poverty.  On the other hand, the periphery and center are always in covert or overt 
confrontation because of the centrifugal tendency and expectation of escape from the 
dependence of the periphery on the center.  Among these two trends—centrifugal and 
dependent—when was the centrifugal trend and confrontation stronger in the context of 
Vietnam-China relations?  When was the trend for dependency stronger?  What factors 
influenced the strengths and weaknesses of these two trends?  These are questions that 
emerge from existing scholarship that this study hopes to clarify when looking back at 
the reality of Vietnam-China relations during the period of feudalism.
Application of the Theory to the Study of the China-Vietnam Relationship 
from the Early Tenth Century to the Late Nineteenth Century
Factors That Make China’s Position Central
The relationship between big country and small country, and between center and periph-
ery, has always been a core issue in international relations.  The word “small” or “big” 
in terms of “small country, big country” is only relative.  A country is smaller when 
compared to countries with a larger territory that are more populated or have stronger 
military, economic, political, or cultural ability to influence and control other countries. 
A country may be bigger than one country but smaller than another one.  Similarly, the 
terms “center” and “periphery” are also relative.  A country can be considered the cen-
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ter of certain peripheral countries, but it can be a peripheral or semi-peripheral country 
in relation to another center.  In these relationships, the center often has many plans and 
options to induce peripheral countries to follow it.  Meanwhile, small and peripheral 
countries are vulnerable: “The vulnerabilities of small nations have been demonstrated 
countless times throughout history” (Goodby 2014, 32).  Therefore, it is not random that 
Thucydides, in The Peloponnesian War, stated that “the strong do what they want to do 
and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides 1954, 358–366).  Although 
this statement is not true in every case, it reflects the superiority of the center and the 
vulnerability of small countries (i.e., peripheries).
At least until 1860, China was considered the center of East Asia.  The year 1860 
was when China formally accepted diplomatic relations directly with the Western powers 
after its defeat in the Second Opium War of 1856–60 and reluctantly abandoned the 
tributary system, although the last remnant of the tributary system lasted until 1885 in 
Vietnam and 1894 in Korea.  China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 lost it 
its last tributary country—Korea (Kim 2008, 35–56).  Surrounding the center (China) 
and its civilized space, peripheral countries were divided into two rings.  The inner one 
was next to the Hua Xi center and included BaiYue (??/?粵) in the south, Beidi (?
?) in the north, and Xirong (??) in the west.  The second—outer—ring included 
countries influenced by the Han civilization, such as Japan, North Korea, and Vietnam.
To gain the central position, China had to have certain advantages over its smaller 
neighbors.  The first advantage came from territory and geographical position.  China had 
the largest territory and population.  In addition, it is in a geographically central position, 
sharing a border with more countries than any other country in the world (it shares a 
border with 14 countries).  Accordingly, China holds a position of “respect,” at least in 
terms of geography.
In terms of economy and politics, China’s favorable natural conditions give it another 
advantage: it has developed a relatively strong agricultural production.  Since ancient 
times, China has reached a high level of socioeconomic development compared to other 
nations.  China was a highly centralized state during the ancient and middle ages.  As a 
centralized feudal political institution and an administrative and social organization model, 
China became the model for Vietnamese feudal dynasties, and many other countries in 
the region learned from China and followed it.  Therefore, China had a preeminent polit-
ical position in the region during the feudalism period.  It had such a strong position that 
other countries did not want to oppose it.
Chinese culture was at that time considered “one of the brightest flames in the East” 
(Ðặng Thai Mai 1994, 30).  Due to its advantages of being rich in material resources as 
well as a large country with a large population, China soon reached a relatively high 
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socioeconomic level compared to other nations.  Very early in its existence, under the 
Han Dynasty, it developed norms of lifestyle, ethics, human behavior, social order, fam-
ily order, and social order.  These norms were called Confucianism.  Standards were set 
by the center and spread to the peripheries, including Vietnam.  Among the ideological 
determinants must be mentioned the unique idea of China’s position in the galaxy.  At 
that time, the Chinese ruling class called its own clan “Huaxia.”  Hua means “essence 
of the universe,” and xia means “strength” (Nguyễn Anh Dũng 1982, 91).  After that, the 
concept of “inside are the Xia, outside are the Yi” was introduced, where Huaxia played 
the central role while the peripheral countries were Nanman, Dongyi, Xirong, and Beidi 
(Four Barbarians in the Four Directions).  The Chinese emperor implicitly attributed to 
himself the role of granting prestige and virtue to all.  He used the Huaxia culture to 
teach the Beidi and Dongyi (also known as “Use Huaxia to change Beidi and Dongyi”; 
Lê Tắc 1961, 43–45).  Liam Kelley, in his book Beyond the Bronze Pillars, asserts that in 
a nutshell, at least since the Shang Dynasty (eighteenth to eleventh century BC), peoples 
classified as “Chinese” have felt that their society, scripts, and complex rituals are supe-
rior to those of wandering desert dwellers, people living in the grasslands in the north 
and northwest, as well as those living in the rain forests in the south (Kelley 2005). 
Therefore, it is logical for Chinese to have hierarchical relationships with others.  Those 
who want to have relations with China must recognize the superiority of the Chinese 
ruler—the Son of Heaven—by kowtowing and offering presents (ibid., 9–23).  Obviously, 
China does not consider itself as the center solely in order to educate peripheral people. 
Those who are influenced by Chinese Confucian ideology maintain the superior and 
inferior positions between them, between the larger country and the smaller one, in 
accordance with the Theory of Righteousness and the Command of Heaven.  Peripheries 
themselves admit the central role of China.  In the case of Vietnam, Alexander Barton 
Woodside in Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and 
Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century does not hesitate to affirm 
that the Vietnamese court was under “Confucian rather than Nationalist” influence 
(Woodside 1988, 21) and that in Vietnam, as in China, it was commonly believed that men 
received their nature or their endowment of abilities and aptitudes from heaven, which 
was the ultimate source of all things.  This belief made the Son of Heaven the humanly 
incarnated source of education and economic sustenance, the “father and mother” of the 
people (ibid., 13).
Vietnamese dynasties did not formally acknowledge Chinese emperors as their 
rulers, but they expressed submission through activities such as offering presents and 
requesting investiture.  In a letter to the Qing Emperor, Gia Long—the first King of the 
Nguyen Dynasty—wrote: “Although people have a lack of allegiance, I still did not know 
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the opinion of Heaven.  I assigned Le Quang Dinh and Trinh to bring along presents to 
show our honesty to rank in the list of vassal states” (Quốc sử quán triều Nguyễn 2002, 
510).  From this point of view, a common Confucian cultural linguistic circle or a system 
of centrally orientated regional order was established, where “all peoples at one level or 
another are subject to the influence of Chinese civilization” (Konrat 1997, 59).
Vietnam was one of the countries most influenced by Chinese culture, especially 
with regard to Confucianism.  If Japanese elites had an attitude of respectful rejection 
when it came to Confucianism, then the Vietnamese elites in the Ly-Tran Dynasties had 
an attitude of resistance and non-refusal (Trần Quốc Vượng 1991, 32–44) while the 
Vietnamese elites during the Le-Nguyen Dynasties had one of resistance and imitation. 
The Vietnamese Confucians tried to show that Confucianism in Vietnam was similar and 
not inferior to Chinese Confucianism.  They considered this as something to be proud of 
and a way for them to affirm Vietnam’s position in relation to other countries in the region. 
The influence of Chinese Confucian culture on its neighbors, including Vietnam, contrib-
uted to making China a “hard center,” a “solid center” in relation to other centers in the 
world as identified by Womack (Womack 2012a, 39).  Under the influence of Confucian-
ism, especially the ideals of “mandate of heaven” and “righteousness,” the Vietnamese 
Kings constantly strove to fulfill their duties according to the rites and rules of a vassal 
in relation to the center, China (i.e., righteousness).
The Subjection to the “Center”—China—of the Periphery—Vietnam—through Requesting 
Investiture and Tribute
The recognition and respect for China’s central role in all aspects, especially its cultural 
superiority, and the acceptance of Confucian influence from the cultural “salvation” of 
the center, had the inevitable consequence of obedience of the center by peripheral 
countries.  Thus, Vietnam voluntarily joined the ranks of peripheral countries that China 
considered as vassals despite knowing that there could be no symmetry of interest in 
this relationship.  This was a root cause for the activities of requesting investiture and 
tribute that were sustained for a long time in the feudal Vietnam-China relationship.
Requesting investiture and tribute in the feudal Vietnam-China relationship indi-
cated a special relationship, which was found only among China and neighboring coun-
tries.  Vietnam was often considered a typical example, with all its complexity (Tạ Ngọc 
Liễn 1995, 49).  Researchers have classed Vietnam’s activities as part of the “tributary 
institution.”  According to J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng in “On the Ch’ing Tributary 
System,” this tributary institution was “the medium for Chinese international relations 
and diplomacy” and “a scheme of things entire . . . the mechanism by which barbarous 
non-Chinese regions were given their place in the all-embracing Chinese political, and 
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therefore ethical, scheme of things” (Fairbank and Teng 1941, 137, 139).  In that environ-
ment, the Emperor felt the need to “civilize” the populace in order to maintain a stable 
social order.  Some Chinese scholars view the term “tributary system” as a Western 
invention, dating back to at least the nineteenth century, which was then translated back 
into Chinese as chaogong tixi (Yang 1968; Liu 2010; Suisheng 2015).  The terms chao and 
gong do appear in the Chinese historical sources, but the Chinese had no conception of 
such a system (Feng 2009, 545–574).  However, it is undeniable that there was a hierar-
chical system where China played a central role and neighboring countries (which China 
considered as Nanman, Dongyi, Xirong, Beidi), such as Vietnam, were classified as vassal- 
peripheries.  Liang and Khilji in China and East Asia’s Post-Crisis Community: A Region 
in Flux, assert that “China, the primus inter pares state in this tribute system, constituted 
the core together with Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, with the system extending to southeast 
Asian States in varying degrees” (Liang and Khilji 2012, 2).  Thus, one of the principles 
for creating and sustaining the tributary system was that China had to consider itself as 
a center and be willing to accept investiture and tributary activities from peripheral 
countries such as Vietnam.  This activity was considered a way to prevent the central-
peripheral relationship from being cut off.  On the one hand, the existence of vassal-
peripheries like Vietnam served China’s political and economic interests; on the other, 
it helped to prevent attacks on China by other countries, creating a stable external 
 environment to maintain domestic stability.
From the Vietnamese perspective, Vietnam remained close to a feudal China so that 
it could learn from that country.  Maintaining a relationship with the center was consid-
ered by Vietnam to be necessary for its own survival.  In fact, Vietnam felt a need to 
maintain a relationship with China not only during the feudal era but throughout its his-
tory.  As stated by Tuong Vu in “State Formation on China’s Southern Frontier: Vietnam 
as a Shadow Empire and Hegemon”: “The threat of assimilation and annexation by ‘China’ 
is often portrayed as the paramount existential problem confronting all ‘Vietnamese’ 
throughout their history who have yearned to preserve their independence even while 
adapting to the ‘Chinese’ culture and worldview” (Tuong Vu 2016, 39).  Thus, the 
“Chinese world order” could not be “merely a unilateral” effort as viewed by Yu Insun 
(2009, 84); it was actually based on demand from both China and Vietnam.  Accordingly, 
Vietnam’s tributes and requesting of investiture from China were born and maintained 
for a long time.
Table 1 lists the times Vietnam requested investiture from China between 938 
(when Vietnam gained independence after centuries of Chinese rule) and 1885 (when 
France and China signed the Tianjin Treaty, which ended the tributary relationship 
between Vietnam and China).
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Table 1 Times When Vietnam Requested Investiture from China (938–1885)
Name of Dynasty Vietnamese Missions Going to China to Request Investiture
Titles That Chinese Emperors Bestowed upon 
Vietnamese Kings
1. Ngo Dynasty 954: Ngo Xuong Ngap sent a mission to the King of 
Southern Han requesting investiture.
Ngo Xuong Ngap was ordained as naval generalissimo.
2. Dinh Dynasty 972: Dinh Tien Hoang sent his son Dinh Lien to the Song 
Dynasty for ordination as a King.
Dinh Tien Hoang was ordained as Giao Chi King.
Dinh Lien was ordained as Annam naval generalissimo.
975: Dinh Tien Hoang was ordained as Nam Viet Vuong, 
and Dinh Lien was ordained as Giao Chi King.
3. Earlier Le Dynasty 980: King Le Dai Hanh sent two envoys—Giang Cu Vong 
and Vuong Thieu To—to the Song Dynasty for ordination 
as King.
985: King Le Dai Hanh sent a mission to the Song Dynasty 
applying for chief.
Song Dynasty did not approve.
Song Dynasty agreed to ordain Le Dai Hanh as a chief.
993: Song Dynasty ordained Le Dai Hanh as Giao Chi 
King.
4. Ly Dynasty 1010: King Ly Thai To sent his people to the Song 
requesting investiture.
1055: King Ly Thanh Tong sent his people to the Song 
requesting investiture.
1138: King Ly Anh Tong sent a mission to the Song 
requesting investiture.
1010: Ly Thai To was ordained as Giao Chi King.
1028: King Ly Thai Tong was ordained as Giao Chi King.
1038: King Ly Thai Tong was ordained as Nam Binh 
Vuong.
1055: King Ly Thanh Tong was ordained as Giao Chi King.
1074: King Ly Nhan Tong was ordained as Giao Chi King.
1130: King Ly Than Tong was ordained as Giao Chi King.
1138: King Ly Anh Tong was ordained as Giao Chi King.
1175: King Ly Anh Tong was ordained as Annam King.
1177: King Ly Cao Tong was ordained as Annam King.
5. Tran Dynasty 1229: King Tran Thai Tong sent a mission to visit the 
Song.
1368: King Tran Du Tong sent a mission to visit the Ming.
1229: King Tran Thai Tong was ordained as Annam King.
1262: King Tran Thanh Tong was ordained as Annam 
King.
1368: Tran Du Tong was ordained as Annam King.
6. Ho Dynasty 1403: Ho Han Thuong sent a mission to the Ming Dynasty 
requesting investiture.
1403: Ming Dynasty ordained Ho Han Thuong as Annam 
King.
7. Primitive  
Le Dynasty
1427: King Le Thai To sent a proposal to the Ming 
Dynasty requesting investiture for Tran Cao.
1429: King Le Thai To sent a mission to the Ming Dynasty 
requesting investiture.
1434: King Le Thai Tong sent a mission mourning Le Thai 
To and requesting investiture.
1442: King Le Nhan Tong sent a mission mourning Le 
Thai Tong and requesting investiture.
1460: King Le Thanh Tong sent a mission requesting 
investiture.
1497: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission mourning Le 
Thanh Tong and requesting investiture.
1504: King Le Duc Tong sent a mission mourning Le Hien 
Tong and requesting investiture.
1510: King Le Tuong Duc sent a mission requesting 
investiture.
1427: Ming Dynasty ordained Tran Cao as Annam King.
1431: King Le was ordained as the Annam national 
advocate.
1435: Ming Dynasty sent messengers to inform the King 
to take care of national affairs.
1443: Ming Dynasty sent messengers to take the decree 
to ordain the King as Annam King.
1462: Ming Dynasty sent messengers to take the decree 
to ordain the King as Annam King.
1499: Ming Dynasty sent messengers to ordain the King 
as Annam King.
1506: Ming Dynasty sent messengers to ordain the King 
as Annam King.
1513: Ming Dynasty sent messengers to ordain the King 
as Annam King.
8. Mac Dynasty 1540: Mac Dang Dung sent a mission carrying sea produce 
to Yenqing requesting investiture.
1540: Mac Dang Dung was ordained as the Annam 
ambassador.
9. Restored  
Le Dynasty
1597: King Le The Tong sent a mission to the Ming 
Dynasty requesting investiture.
1637: King Le Than Tong sent a mission to the Ming 
Dynasty requesting investiture.
1598: King Le The Tong was ordained as Annam 
governor.
1647: King Le Than Tong (now retired Emperor) was 
ordained as Annam King.
1667: King Le Huyen Tong was ordained as Annam King.
1683: King Ly Hy Tong was ordained as Annam King.
1719: King Le Du Tong was ordained as Annam King.
1734: Ordained King Le Thuan Tong as Annam King.
1761: King Le Hien Tong was ordained as Annam King.
1778: King Le Chieu Thong was ordained as Annam King.
10. Tay Son Dynasty 1789: King Quang Trung sent a mission to the Qing 
Dynasty requesting investiture.
1792: King Quang Toan sent a mission to the Qing 
Dynasty mourning King Quang Trung and requesting 
investiture.
1789: King Quang Trung was ordained as Annam King.
1792: King Quang Toan was ordained as Annam King.
11. Nguyen Dynasty 1802: A delegation led by Le Quang Dinh applied for 
ordination to King Gia Long.
1820: A delegation led by Ngo Vi applied for ordination to 
King Minh Menh.
1841: A delegation led by Le Van Phuc applied for 
ordination to King Thieu Tri.
1848: A delegation led by Bui Quy applied for ordination to 
King Tu Duc.
1804: A Chinese delegation led by Sam Nghi Dong carried 
the decree and the national seal to Thang Long, 
proclaiming Gia Long as Annam King.
1822: A Chinese delegation led by Phan Cung Thi carried 
the decree from the Emperor of China to Thang Long to 
confer on Minh Menh the title of Annam King.
1842: A Chinese delegation led by Bao Thanh carried the 
decree from the Emperor of China to Thang Long to 
confer on Thieu Tri the title of Annam King.
1849: A Chinese delegation led by Lao Sung Quang carried 
the decree from the Emperor of China to Hue imperial 
city to confer on Tu Duc the title of Annam King.
Sources: Quốc sử quán triều Nguyễn (2002; 2004; 2007d; 2007e); Hongnian (2006); Phan Huy Chú (2007).
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Clearly, such beseeching activities started in the tenth century (from the time of 
Ngo Xuong Ngap [r. 951–54]), after Vietnam had broken free of Chinese feudalistic rule 
and regained full independence.  It was only through military defeat that China returned 
Vietnam its sovereignty and admitted its new King.  In other words, the peaceful relation-
ship through the beseeching of investiture between the center—China—and periphery—
Vietnam—existed only when China could not expand to or occupy Vietnam.  If pre-
modern Sino-Vietnamese relations are divided into the three states of interaction outlined 
by James A. Anderson—Strong China/Weak Vietnam, Weak China/Strong Vietnam, and 
Strong China/Strong Vietnam (Anderson 2013)—the requesting and receipt of investiture 
took place only when the two countries were in the second (Weak China/Strong Vietnam) 
or third (Strong China/Strong Vietnam) state.  Only in the second or third state would 
China become a “benevolent big brother” of Vietnam (Tuong Vu 2016, 53).  This was 
the reality of the Vietnam-China relationship during feudalism.  Phan Huy Chu, in his 
Dynasty’s History, also noted this characteristic:
Our country started to communicate with China since the Hung King, but with small title and not 
to participate in the ranks of the vassals gathered in the “Ming Tang” to meet the Emperor.  Then 
our country was conquered by Zhou Tuo, the Han assigned him as South Viet King which was 
considered as a Chinese vassal rather than being a country.  Then our country was turned to be a 
district in the Han Dynasty.  After Dinh Tien Hoang swept away missions, recovered and expanded 
the territory, the beseech investiture was received from China to be a country. (Phan Huy Chú 
2007, 534–535)
Since then, through the dynasties of Dinh (968–80), Earlier Le (980–1009), Ly (1009–
1225), Tran (1225–1400), Ho (1400–7), Primitive Le (1428–1527), Mac (1527–92), 
Restored Le (1533–1789), Tay Son (1789–1802), and Nguyen (1802–1885), the request-
ing of investiture in accordance with the regulations became particularly important in 
diplomatic relations between Vietnam and China.  Most of the Vietnamese dynasties 
requested investiture with China.
According to normal practice, when Vietnam’s King died his successor sent an 
ambassador to China to announce the funeral, and a mission began to apply for the King’s 
investiture.  In response, China would assign a mission to ordain the King of Vietnam. 
In such cases, the Vietnamese King was “soft” and implemented solemn rituals to be 
ordained and receive the title from the Chinese Emperor (Friends of Hue Ancient Capital 
1993, 306).  Even after those rituals, Vietnamese dynasties had to give presents and hold 
parties for Chinese missions (ibid., 90–92).
Along with beseeching investiture, the vassal Vietnam tried to implement many 
tribute activities to show respect to the “upper country” and assure its own national 
security and sovereignty.  In some dynasties, such as the Nguyen, this was also a way to 
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ensure the value of investiture that the Emperors of China granted the Kings of Vietnam. 
This assurance was necessary for the legitimacy and independence of the dynasty.  This 
is something that the Nguyen Dynasty had not had since its inception.  Tributary activity 
was considered by both Vietnam and China as a means of exchanging products due to the 
natural needs of the two countries’ economic development.  Obviously there was a real 
match between reality and Shils’s, Womack’s, and Wallerstein’s theories, as they 
acknowledged the reverence of peripheral states toward the center and the humility of 
the periphery while maintaining a relationship that was interdependent with the center 
even if it was an unequal interest relationship.
From the Dinh Dynasty, Earlier Le Dynasty, and Ly Dynasty in the tenth, eleventh, 
and twelfth centuries, Vietnamese missions were sent to the Song Dynasty; they did not 
carry tribute but brought presents for building friendships and showing gratitude.  It was 
not until the thirteenth century, when Tran Thai Tong sent a mission to China, that the 
rule was made about a tribute every three years; this is when the Chinese tribute regime 
by Vietnam is considered to have started.  However, Table 2 shows that due to various 
reasons (on both the Vietnamese and Chinese sides) the tribute did not always follow 
the rules.  However, tribute was always a diplomatic activity dictated by the Vietnamese 
feudal dynasties because it was an indispensable means of communication in maintaining 
diplomatic relations with the center—which was China at the time.
When assessing and explaining the long-term existence of tributes between central 
China and peripheral countries in a vassal position, such as Vietnam, Kelley states that 
there must have been a logical reason why the outward kingdoms accepted the inferior 
relationships, which Western countries did not accept in the nineteenth century when 
dealing with China.  According to him, the above tribute activities from Vietnam repre-
sented a state of “self-consciousness,” not a “defensive strategy.”  Therefore, they might 
have been just a formality (Kelley 2005, 9–23).  After Kelley, Fairbank, Teng, and Keith 
Taylor emphasized the dual nature of the tribute system.  Taylor said, “Vietnam is doing 
so based on a realistic assessment of strategic interests, especially when there is always 
a choice between accepting the unfair terms of tribute system and bearing the risk of 
attack from the centre” (quoted in Lam 1968, 165–179).  According to Taylor, these 
activities on the part of Vietnam were “pretending” in order to maintain independence 
and harmony and avoid a bloody war (Taylor 1983, 271).
Independence, Centralization of the “Periphery”—Vietnam—in Relation to the “Center”—
China
There are two opposite views when evaluating tributary activities between Vietnam and 
China.  However, if we observe the evolution of these activities, especially their specific 
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Table 2 Years in Which Vietnam Went to China for Tribute (938–1885)
Name of Dynasty Years in Which Vietnam Went to China for Tribute Frequency of Tribute
1. Ngo Dynasty (938–67) 0
2. Dinh Dynasty (968–80) 0
3. Earlier Le Dynasty 
(980–1009)
0
4. Ly Dynasty (1009–1225) 0
5. Tran Dynasty (1225–1400) – 1258: King Tran Thai Tong sent envoys to take tribute to China. The two sides decided on the 
frequency of tribute: once in three years.
– 1275: King Tran Thanh Tong sent envoys to take tribute to the Yuan Dynasty.
– 1292: King Tran Nhan Tong sent envoys to take tribute to the Yuan Dynasty.
– 1331: King Tran Hien Tong sent envoys to take tribute to the Yuan Dynasty.
4
6. Primitive Le Dynasty 
(1428–1527)
– 1444: King Le Nhan Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1447: King Le Nhan Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1450: King Le Nhan Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1453: King Le Nhan Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1462: King Le Thanh Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1471: King Le Thanh Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1474: King Le Thanh Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1477: King Le Thanh Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1480: King Le Thanh Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1483: King Le Thanh Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1486: King Le Thanh Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1489: King Le Thanh Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1492: King Le Thanh Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1498: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1501: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1504: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1510: King Le Tuong Duc sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1513: King Le Tuong Duc sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
18
7. Mac Dynasty (1527–92) – 1542: Mac Dang Dung sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1548: Mac Phuc Nguyen sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1580: Mac Mau Hop sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1584: Mac Mau Hop sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
4
8. Restored Le Dynasty 
(1533–1789)
– 1595: King Le The Tong sent a mission to offer tribute but failed.
– 1596: King Le The Tong sent a mission to offer tribute but was not approved by the Ming 
Dynasty and returned.
– 1597: King Le The Tong sent a mission to take local produce as tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1606: King Le Kinh Tong sent a mission to take two tributes to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1613: King Le Kinh Tong sent a mission to take two tributes to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1619: King Le Than Tong sent a mission to take two tributes to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1626: King Le Than Tong sent a mission to take two tributes to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1630: King Le Than Tong sent a mission to take two tributes to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1637: King Le Than Tong sent a mission to take two tributes to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1646: King Le Chan Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Ming Dynasty.
– 1663: King Le Huyen Tong sent a mission to take local produce as tribute to the Qing 
Dynasty.
– 1667: King Le Huyen Tong sent a mission to take local produce as tribute to the Qing Dynasty 
and applied to offer tribute as in the Wanli period of the Ming Dynasty: tribute was offered 
once every six years.
– 1673: As a rule, King Gia Long sent envoys to take two tributes to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1682: King Le Hy Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1685: King Le Hy Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1690: King Le Hy Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1697: King Le Hy Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1702: King Le Hy Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1715: King Le Du Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1721: King Le Du Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1726: King Le Du Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1729: Hon Duc Cong (Le Duy Phuong) sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1741: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1747: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1753: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1760: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1765: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1771: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1777: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1783: King Le Hien Tong sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
30
9. Tay Son Dynasty 
(1789–1802)
– April 1789: King Quang Trung sent a mission to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– September 1789: King Quang Trung sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
2
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movements in each historical period through the feudal dynasties in Vietnam, we see 
that no matter how strict, activities of Vietnamese Kings were dependent on the strength 
of Vietnam in relation to China, as well as the potential and positions of the two countries. 
After Dinh Tien Hoang (r. 968–79) and Quang Trung (r. 1788–92) took the throne, mis-
sions were sent to China to ask for investiture.  However, in many cases it was the 
Chinese imperial court that sent missions to ordain the head of the Vietnamese state. 
Instances of these are during the reigns of Tran Thai Tong (r. 1225–58), Tran Thanh 
Tong (r. 1258–78), and Tran Nhan Tong (r. 1279–93).  These periods are associated with 
Dai Viet’s great military victories over invasions.  These Kings assigned the throne to 
each other rather than going to China to beseech investiture.
Even though the Vietnamese mission knelt in the presence of the Chinese Emperor 
in Beijing, the head of the Vietnamese state still claimed to be the Emperor of the Viet-
namese people and the smaller surrounding countries.  Clearly, the use of the Sino-
Vietnamese title of Emperor by Vietnam was a deliberate decision.  It showed simultane-
ously the tendencies of “Heavy sinicization” and “Heavy cultural resistance” coexisting 
in Vietnam until the end of the monarchy (Woodside 1988, 13).
According to Tsuboi Yoshiharu, the Nguyen Dynasty—Vietnam’s last feudal 
dynasty—had cultural self-respect because they regarded themselves as having a 
better tradition than the Qing Dynasty and an orthodox Confucianism protector (Tsuboi 
1992, 134).  Therefore, if the Qing did not behave appropriately, the Nguyen Dynasty 
immediately expressed their dissatisfaction.  For example, in 1840 the Ministry of Rites 
reported to King Minh Menh that the procession of envoys to the Qing Dynasty had 
been arranged by the Qing Dynasty behind the envoys of Goryeo (North Korea), Nan 
Zhang (Laos), Siam, and Liu Qiu and asked how to respond.  Minh Menh immediately 
replied:
10. Nguyen Dynasty 
(1802–85)
– 1804: King Gia Long sent his envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty, replacing the 
tributes of 1803 and 1805.
– 1809: As a rule, King Gia Long sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1813: As a rule, King Gia Long sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1817: As a rule, King Gia Long sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1824: As a rule, King Minh Menh sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1828: As a rule, King Minh Menh sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1832: As a rule, King Minh Menh sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1836: As a rule, King Minh Menh sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1844: King Thieu Tri sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1849: As a rule, King Tu Duc sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1853: As a rule, King Tu Duc sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1857: As a rule, King Tu Duc sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1860: As a rule, King Tu Duc sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1868: As a rule, King Tu Duc sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1872: As a rule, King Tu Duc sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1876: As a rule, King Tu Duc sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
– 1880: As a rule, King Tu Duc sent envoys to take tribute to the Qing Dynasty.
17
Sources: Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. (1993a; 1993b); Quốc sử quán triều Nguyễn (2002; 2004; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 
2007d; 2007e; 2007f); Hongnian (2006); Phan Huy Chú (2007, 570–608).
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This is due to the negligence of the Ministry of Rites of the Qing Dynasty.  Goryeo is the country 
of culture, Nan Zhang is our vassal offering us tribute, and Siam and Liu Qiu are barbarian countries 
(??).  This is unacceptable.  If anything like this happens, get out of the row; it’s better to be 
punished. (Quốc sử quán triều Nguyễn 2007c, 872)
Minh Menh’s national pride came from his view that Vietnam was a civilized country and 
therefore this mistake by the Ministry of Rites toward the Qing Dynasty was a great 
insult to Vietnam (Yu 2009, 93).  Even the ability to express the linguistic and cultural 
qualities of Vietnamese ambassadors in the Chinese court was an important way to show 
that Vietnam was a “civilized” country and did not need China’s “modernization” (Taylor 
1983, 298).
It is noteworthy that until 1838, without being approved by the Qing Dynasty, King 
Ming Menh decided to change the name of the country from Vietnam to Dai Nam (Great 
South) to signify a strong southern country.  As Minh Menh explained: “Now we have 
the South, the wider territory, an eastern strip to the South Sea, around the West Sea, 
our people belong to the map, forests and beaches belong to us.”  Thus, changing the 
name to Dai Nam was suitable, “showing the scale, while keeping the word Viet” (Quốc 
sử quán triều Nguyễn 2007c, 276).  In his explanation for naming the country Dai Nam, 
Minh Menh also cited the Qing Dynasty’s naming of China: “To the Qing Dynasty once 
called Manchuria, then renamed Great Qing, is the right thing to do” (ibid.).  This expla-
nation reveals Minh Menh’s high self-esteem and is “an expression of Minh Menh’s 
antagonism toward the Qing dynasty and his reaction to the ‘Ta Qing’ (Great Qing) 
 designation” (Yu 2009, 103).  From here on, the country was called Dai Nam; all vocatives, 
documents, even diplomatic documents were required to adhere to it and “not to say Dai 
Viet” (Quốc sử quán triều Nguyễn 2007c, 277).
It has been suggested that Vietnam’s submission to China was self-sacrifice rather 
than pretense, as Kelley has commented.  However, according to Kelley, if this were the 
case then Vietnam would not have achieved true independence.  Obviously there is no 
logic in the requesting of investiture and tribute, just survival behavior between the 
center and periphery in the contemporary context.  Such behavior is wise in the context 
of a small country interacting with a bigger and stronger one.  Hence, a nominal “pre-
tender” (also known as the pretense, according to Taylor) may accept a vassal, peripheral 
role rather than confrontation, as that was clearly beneficial for Vietnam.  It was because 
of that pretense, when the fate or honor of the country was violated, that Vietnamese 
dynasties did not hesitate to declare their own existence.  The resistance war against the 
Song during the Ly Dynasty (1009–1225), two resistance wars against the invasion of 
the Yuan by the Tran Dynasty (1225–1400), the resistance war against Ming invaders 
during the Ho Dynasty (1400–7), and the resistance war against the invaders of the Qing 
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in the late eighteenth century (1788–89) clearly proved the independent trend of the 
periphery Vietnam.  Although it was an act of soft, humble submission through the 
requesting of investiture, tribute, and offerings to the center (China) to maintain peace-
ful relations between the two, when the fate of the nation was threatened, Vietnam was 
ready to stand up and fight to defend its independence.  Obviously, smaller countries like 
Vietnam are always “vulnerable” (Womack 2004, 365).  If large countries like China 
cooperate with Vietnam, Vietnam will be less worried about its vulnerability and tend to 
accept a world order driven by China because it achieves its own interests by doing so 
(ibid.).  Conversely, when a large country like China does not cooperate and threatens 
the interests of the smaller nation, thereby making the latter vulnerable, the trend of 
dependence becomes increasingly loose and the two countries may even confront each 
other, producing a conflict and maybe a war like the examples mentioned above.  As a 
result, the borders of peace that have been built on a “mutually acceptable relationship” 
(Womack 2012a, 42) between the two sides are inevitably disrupted.
A centrifugal effort to change the national status of the Nguyen Dynasty Kings was 
vividly demonstrated in the setting up of a new center in the South, similar to the Chinese 
one in the North, where Southeast Asia, a region that China had few relations with, had 
to recognize Vietnamese moral values and greatness in the same way that the Nguyen 
Dynasty acknowledged the Chinese court.  In fact, in the first half of the nineteenth 
century countries to the southwest of Vietnam such as Chenla (Cambodia), Van Tuong 
(a part of Central Laos, bordering Nghe An north of Vietnam today), Nam Chuong (in the 
west of Hoa Binh province and in northern Thanh Hoa province of Vietnam today), Thuy 
Xa (in western Phu Yen province of Vietnam today), and Hoa Xa (a tribe in the west of 
Thuy Xa, also in the west of Phu Yen province of Vietnam today) carried out tribute and 
“beseech investiture” for the Nguyen Dynasty.  Clearly, in its relations with many other 
Southeast Asian countries at that time, Vietnam played the role of a center (Quốc sử 
quán triều Nguyễn 1994; 2002; 2004; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d; 2007e; 2007f).  This 
is in line with Womack’s theory, which points out that one of the most important factors 
that can weaken China’s central position is an increase in relations among peripheral 
countries (Womack 2012a, 44).  Not only is it consistent with Womack’s theory, it also 
coincides with Wallerstein’s insight that an asymmetry of interest in the relationship 
between center and periphery will cause the periphery to move, to fight for centrifugation 
and escape from dependence on the center, changing the current order publicly or insid-
iously.  That centrifugal tendency led to the formation of new centers complementing 
the original center, like the case of Vietnam in the nineteenth century.
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Difference between “China-Centered” and “Vietnam-Centered” Models
It is worth mentioning that although Vietnam still used the Chinese world model, Viet-
namese authorities had a different viewpoint.  The North and South were divided in two, 
with one side celebrating China and recognizing China’s world order, and the other keep-
ing its own world order.  Hence, despite receiving the title of King from Chinese Emper-
ors, the heads of Vietnam proclaimed themselves as Emperor to their own people, plac-
ing themselves at the same level as the Emperor of China.  This was also a manifestation 
of Vietnam’s independence in its relations with China.  For example, in the relationship 
between Vietnam (center) and Champa (periphery), if Champa delayed or neglected to 
fulfill its obligation to contribute, Vietnam as a “mother country” could even rebuke 
Champa and ask it to pay tribute.  This was seen in 1094, when King Ly Nhan Tong sent 
the academic Mac Hien Tich to Champa to claim tribute (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a, 283), 
and in 1346, when King Tran Du Tong sent Pham Nguyen Hang to Champa to ask about 
the lack of annual tribute (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b, 130).  In 1435, when the Champa 
envoys went to Vietnam, King Le Thai Tong immediately asked, “Why don’t you offer 
annual tribute?”  According to the King, it was a manifestation of “Failure to keep the 
rite of a small country to a big country” (ibid., 333).  Obviously, this was a straightforward 
rebuke.  In many cases when Champa offered tribute, the Dai Viet court brought troops 
to fight Champa.  For example, under Ly Thanh Tong, in 1065–69, Champa did not pay 
tribute and King Ly Thanh Tong brought the army to fight (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a, 
274–275).  In July 1176, after not receiving tribute, offerings, or any other gestures from 
Champa for a long time, the Ly Dynasty again sent General To Hien Thanh to fight 
Champa.  In October of that year, Champa hurried to offer tribute to ask for peace (ibid., 
324).  Obviously, the peacetime relationship between Vietnam and Champa at that time 
was deeply influenced by the theories of Son of Heaven, the Mandate of Heaven of the 
Chinese-style world order.  The Vietnamese dynasties had to make dependents like 
Champa periodically send envoys and offer tribute to the Vietnamese court to acknowl-
edge their devotion to the Sino-Vietnamese culture (Woodside 1988, 234).  Symbols (such 
as Heaven, Son of Heaven) and the formula of the Chinese tribute system were also used 
by Vietnam to justify the King’s reign and the existence of a Vietnam-centered order.
Although the two orders coexisted, the order of the “China of the South” was much 
looser than “the real Chinese one” (ibid.).  Unlike China, Vietnam was never the largest 
“center” in East Asia.  Vietnam was always subjected to invasions from China and pro-
moted a spirit of harmony to subdue the weaker countries around it to make them respect 
it and rely on its protection.  Vietnam did this in order to achieve a relative balance of 
power in its relations with Great China.  On the other hand, if the Chinese world-centered 
order was operating in strict accordance with the principles of Confucianism—principles 
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that were deeply imbedded in both China and its vassal countries—in the world order in 
which Vietnam played a central role, there was no common bond of Confucian ideology. 
Many vassal states within Vietnam, typically Champa, were more deeply influenced by 
Hinduism than Confucianism.  Thus, the two sides of the Vietnam-Champa relationship 
did not have the ideological unity found in Vietnam-China relations.  Accordingly, 
beseeching of investiture and tribute, which were considered a duty and responsibility 
that the vassals (peripherals) needed to perform in relation to the master (center) to 
ensure the latter’s honor and position according to Confucianism, were not fully and 
regularly implemented by Champa and were often ignored for a very long time, as seen 
in the complaint of King Ly Thai Tong (r. 1028–54) (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a, 263).
Following the evolution of relations between Vietnam and small (peripheral) coun-
tries in the West and South in the nineteenth century, we see that the Nguyen Dynasty 
followed a foreign policy of “being soft for the far.”  This means that they implemented 
soft and clever policies for peripheral and distant countries (Quốc sử quán triều Nguyễn 
1994, 355).  The “being soft for the far” foreign policy made the Nguyen Dynasty sym-
pathetic toward vassals.  For instance, after the 1824 tribute ceremony, when Van Tuong 
was at war, King Minh Menh (1820–41) exempted all ceremonies.  Sympathetic to the 
distance and the difficult situation of the “vassals,” the Nguyen Dynasty often exempted 
other countries’ missions from going to the capital Hue to provide tribute.  For example, 
when the Chenla ambassador went to Gia Dinh province in 1832, the Emperor sent an 
exemption, rewarded him, and allowed him to go back home (Quốc sử quán triều Nguyễn 
2007a, 315).  And in 1834, when Chenla had to deal with Siamese invaders, King Minh 
Menh gave it permission to not provide tribute and let it “combine two times into one 
next year”; by doing so, the King showed the kindness of the Nguyen court toward vas-
sals (Quốc sử quán triều Nguyễn 1994, 1776).  In addition, in 1852, when the countries 
of Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa sent missions to provide tribute, the Tu Duc King allowed them 
to perform a ceremony in Phu Yen province (rather than going to the capital Hue) because 
of the distance of their trip and the poor crop the previous year (Quốc sử quán triều 
Nguyễn 2007e, 248–249).  These are actions that were not encountered in the relation-
ship between China and Vietnam from 938 to 1885.
Clearly, Vietnam’s attitude toward small countries and its surrounding periphery 
was not to act as the big guy or big country.  It remained nonthreatening.  In fact, the big 
country of Vietnam was supportive and helpful and even protected and sheltered small 
countries that were endangered and annexed.  For example, in 1313 King Tran Anh Tong 
immediately sent his troops to save Champa when it was invaded by Siam (Ngô Sĩ Liên 
et al. 1993b, 99).  This was an act of responsibility by the superior to the vassal/periphery, 
the rite prescribed by Confucian thought.  Under the Nguyen Dynasty, King Minh Menh 
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used to send the following message of support to vassals: “If neighbors cause catastrophe, 
we will have the way to manage, don’t worry” (Quốc sử quán triều Nguyễn 2007a, 545). 
That statement was proven by Minh Menh’s concrete actions during his rule.  For exam-
ple, in 1822 when Chenla experienced a severe famine, Minh Menh did not hesitate to 
open stockpiles of food and deliver rice to the hungry people of Chenla (Quốc sử quán 
triều Nguyễn 1994, 1748).  In 1833, when Chenla encountered a crisis with Siam, the 
King of Chenla had to flee with his wife and children into the interior of Vietnam.  Once 
again, Minh Menh showed his sympathy by providing rice and money.  He also sent troops 
to Chenla to fight the Siamese enemy and escorted the Chenla King back to his country 
(ibid., 1775).  In 1840 Chenla faced an internal rebellion led by Tang Ke, which was a 
problem it could not solve.  The King sent his envoy to Vietnam to ask for troops to help 
rescue the kingdom.  Minh Menh honored the responsibility of a master and immediately 
sent troops to the rescue, cutting off the head of Tang Ke and making the rebels sur-
render.  Minh Menh also left some soldiers to protect Chenla and escorted the arrested 
rebels for the King of Chenla to punish (ibid., 1745–1746).  These were all noble gestures 
and show the benevolence of the King of the Nguyen Dynasty at the time.  On the other 
hand, they also show the sense of responsibility felt by the superior Vietnam toward its 
vassals when the latter were in jeopardy.
Smaller countries like Van Tuong, Chenla, Thuy Xa, and Hoa Xa worshipped Viet-
nam partly because of their desire to be “civilized” and educated.  As King Minh Menh 
said when Hoa Xa went for tribute in 1834:
Their country is far from overseas, knotted to mark main things, plowing the field to eat, be back-
ward, but they also have teeth, hair like everyone else; there is also conscience, and virtue, why 
we cannot do the same thing together?  So he used Chinese religious ceremony to convert habits, 
teach politeness and reason, and was increasingly penetrated by the Kinh people’s culture. (Quốc 
sử quán triều Nguyễn 2007b, 306)
According to Shils’s, Womack’s, and Wallerstein’s theories, the allegiance of small states 
(i.e., peripheries) comes from an attitude of respect for the political, economic, and cul-
tural potential of the center in addition to security concerns.  It was very important for 
China, Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries to contribute to maintaining the activities 
of beseeching investiture and tribute between China and Vietnam, and Vietnam and 
Southeast Asian countries for a long time.
It is worth noting that in their central role, China and Vietnam behaved differently 
toward their peripheral countries.  While Vietnam was soft in its conduct, willing to share 
responsibility and help peripheral countries when needed, China was stricter in demand-
ing tributes and sacrifices from vassals; during feudal times China even threatened and 
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directed troops to invade the periphery Vietnam on several occasions.  Especially when 
Vietnam was under the Nguyen Dynasty, China failed to fulfill its responsibility by aban-
doning and “selling” its vassal Vietnam to France in exchange for selfish interests through 
a series of peace treaties with France in the second half of the nineteenth century.  The 
treaty for “peace, friendship and trade” in Tianjin (commonly known as the Tianjin 
Treaty) was signed on June 9, 1885 between the representatives of France—Jules 
Patenotre—and China—Li Hongzhang.  At the beginning, when outlining the reasons 
for signing, the treaty expressed a spirit of compromise for the benefit of both France 
and China on the issue of Vietnam:
The President of the Republic of France and the Emperor of China desiring to end the difficulties 
of intervening each one in the internal affairs of Annam, restoring and improving the existing 
friendship and trade relations between France and China, decided to sign a new treaty to meet the 
common interests of the two countries. (Documents diplomatiques 1885, 259–260)
Accordingly, each side was asked to maintain security in its territory adjacent to the 
border, and the militaries of the two sides were asked to not cross the border into the 
territory of the other.  China once again acknowledged France’s dominance in Vietnam 
and pledged no harm to France’s pacification program there.  The signatories to the treaty 
agreed to respect present and future treaties, conventions, and agreements signed 
between France and Vietnam (Article 2 of the Tianjin Treaty of 1885) (ibid., 260–261). 
Obviously, China sold its vassal Vietnam to France based on its own selfish interests. 
After that, it was inevitable that the formalism and “pretending” in the tribute and 
beseeching investiture of Vietnam to China was bolder than these activities from the 
Southeast Asian countries to Vietnam.  Accordingly, Vietnam’s centrifugal tendency to 
break out of the influence of the Chinese center was also stronger and more drastic than 
that of the Vietnamese vassal states at the time.  The birth of a new, centrally located 
order that coexisted with the old-centric order was an inevitable consequence of this 
strong centrifugal tendency.
Conclusion
The center-periphery theory is born of real life, and in turn it serves the realities of life, 
especially in explaining phenomena taking place in practice.  In this particular case, the 
theory is used to help us understand the expressive and substantive aspects of the Viet-
nam-China relationship during feudalism.  Specifically, from Shils’s, Womack’s, and 
Wallerstein’s theories, we know that the factors that made China the center were its 
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superiority in politics, economy, military, and culture.  China’s great advantages, espe-
cially its dominant cultural tradition, made smaller countries such as Vietnam respect 
and rely on protection or “civilizing” from China for a long time.  This was particularly 
true under the influence of Chinese Confucianism, especially the notions of “mandate of 
heaven” and “righteousness.”  Not only did China place itself at the center to educate 
people from the peripheral countries, but these peripheries—influenced by Confucian 
ideology—respected the upper and lower order between the great country and the small 
country to be compatible with righteousness and the rules of heaven.  This explains why 
the requesting of investiture and tribute in the relationship between China and Vietnam 
was maintained from the tenth century to the end of the nineteenth century.  It is the 
persistence of this tributary system based on Confucian ideology that has contributed 
significantly to China being a “hard center” and “solid center” in relation to other centers 
of the world (known as Womack’s discovery) (Womack 2012a, 39).
It may be said that maintaining the requesting of investiture and tribute for a long 
time to keep the harmonious relationship between the two sides is the most important 
manifestation of the dependence of the periphery (Vietnam) on the center (China).  How-
ever, based on the theory of Womack and Wallerstein, we get a better understanding of 
the duality of the relationship.  As they noted, besides the trend of dependence of the 
periphery on the center, there is a centrifugal or confrontation trend between them 
because of asymmetries of interest.  However, the theorists have not pointed out these 
two tendencies, in which situation one plays the leading role and why.  When looking at 
the Vietnam-China relationship of this period, we see that the dependence of the periph-
ery is relative; the centrifugal trend is the dominant one.  This is also the contribution of 
research practice, clarifying some issues that the center-periphery theory has not 
addressed.  As the asymmetry of benefits between the center and the periphery increases, 
the position of the periphery gets stronger, and the responsibility and assistance of the 
center for the periphery decreases, the centrifugal tendency of peripheral countries 
increases.  Therefore, in many cases when Vietnam’s position became higher after the 
great military victories before China’s aggression, the Chinese court had to actively send 
people for ordination and Vietnamese Kings did not go to China requesting investiture. 
For instance, Kings Tran Thai Tong (r. 1225–58), Tran Thanh Tong (r. 1258–78), and 
Tran Nhan Tong (r. 1279–93) of the Tran Dynasty ceded the throne to each other and 
did not go to China requesting investiture.  And though Chinese Emperors ordained them 
as Vietnamese Kings, Vietnam’s heads of state still claimed to be Emperors or “Son of 
Heaven” in relation to people in the country and smaller countries around, in the way 
that the Emperor of the Chinese court claimed.  In addition, the centrifugal tendency of 
the periphery was manifested in Vietnam’s willingness to fight as the destiny of the nation 
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was threatened by the center.  Thus, despite Vietnam’s posture of humility, softness, 
and tribute to China in order to keep the “borders of peace” on the basis of a “mutually 
acceptable relationship” (ibid., 42), when the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties 
invaded, Vietnam was willing to resolutely fight to maintain its independence.  This 
centrifugal trend was vividly shown by the construction of a new order in the South 
(Vietnam-centered) on a par with the North (China-centered), in which Vietnam simu-
lated how to operate the new order through the tributary system as China did with its 
peripheries, despite the “Chinese order of the South” being looser than the true Chinese 
order.
Clearly, just as the theory has shown, there is no permanent center because the 
positions of the center and periphery are always changing.  It is this positional shift that 
explains why the periphery, Vietnam, became the center in its relationships with smaller 
countries in Southeast Asia.  The coexistence of the two orders (a China-centric order 
and a Vietnam-centric one) helped Vietnam achieve a balanced position in comparison 
with neighboring China for a long time.
At some point, when the center no longer represents the progressive forces of the 
times, it will be replaced by other centers.  This has been vividly confirmed in the East 
Asian region.  Since the end of the nineteenth century, China has no longer been the only 
major center of influence in East Asia.  There are new centers, such as Japan, Korea, and 
advanced countries in the West.  That has required Vietnam to reselect the center.  The 
reselection does not mean that Vietnam completely renounces China, because it cannot 
be denied that Vietnam and China are neighbors.  Whether Vietnam wants to or not, it 
cannot deny that the development and growth of China at present, especially in the con-
text of globalization, has a great influence on other countries in the region and around 
the world and Vietnam is no exception.  Vietnam can still use active resources from the 
center, China, without being dependent on it in all respects, and should choose other 
centers to set up partnerships with.  This is extremely advantageous in today’s flat world, 
where geographic distance no longer plays a decisive role in establishing a center- 
periphery relationship.  It is important to take advantage of active resources from centers 
around the world while constantly moving to escape the peripheral position (or the cen-
tripetal tendency, as stated by Wallerstein).  This will allow Vietnam to become a center 
alongside China, Japan, and Korea.  This is an issue that needs to be resolved to ensure 
the sustainable development of Vietnam at present and in the future.
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